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Actual performance records of production contract farmers are used to assess the extent
to which contract production reduces the risk borne by pork producers. Comparisons of
contracting relative to independent market production reveal that farmers who enter into
production contracts based on absolute performance measures reduce risks associated with
variable income. Weak evidence is found that relative performance contracts, similar to
those used in the broiler chicken industry, furtherreduce income variability. The effec-
tiveness of such relative performance contracts will rely on several factors; among these
are increased contract production and a more uniform pork production and processing
system.
Key Words: absolute performance payment, income variability, pork industry, production
contracts, relative performance payment, risk shifting.
Improvements in disease control and genetics
facilitated the development of large-scale,
confined livestock and poultry operations. Be-
yond altering size, technological advance-
ments led to the reorganization of production
and marketing in these industries. The most
conspicuous changes occurred in the broiler
chicken industry, which is essentially entirely
vertically coordinated either via production
contracts or company-owned farms. The pork
industry appears to be following a similar
course as it moves toward a more vertically
coordinated organizational design.
Contract hog production is an important
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part of the emerging system of vertical coor-
dination. Nearly 17% of the hogs slaughtered
in 1994 were finished on contract (Grimes and
Rhodes). Contract farming is even more wide-
ly used in nontraditional pork producing areas.
Industry experts suggest as much as 80% of
total production in North Carolina is contract
finished. Production contracts differ from oth-
er forms of vertical coordination in that they
specify marketing and production practices.
Coordination itself is done by the contractor
or “integrator.” This individual or firm owns
the animals and provides inputs ranging from
feeder pigs and feed to veterinary services.
The farmer’s major contributions include labor
and housing, a substantial capital investment.
Farmer compensation is at a rate (typically
based on the number of hogs and the rate of
gain) predetermined in the contract. This con-
tractual rate of pay does not rely on the market
price of hogs or of inputs (feed).268 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1997
Since a contract farmer’s pay is not subject
to fluctuations in major input or output prices,
the risk associated with variability in his or her
income should be less than that of an inde-
pendent producer. In fact, the primary reason
given by producers for choosing contract
farming is the combination of less market risk
and a less variable income (Rhodes and
Grimes). Previous research on pork production
contracts has focused mainly on descriptive
analysis and profitability issues (Johnson and
Foster; Kliebenstein and Hillburn; McDaniel
et al.; Zering and Beals). The current study
attempts to assess the extent to which contract
production reduces the risk borne by pork pro-
ducers. 1To do this, the actual performance re-
cords of 123 contract growers are used to ad-
dress three issues. First, the extent of risk
shifting provided by the absolute performance
contracts currently used in the industry is mea-
sured. Second, the potential for additional risk
shifting if relative performance contracts (sim-
ilar to those used in the broiler chicken indus-
try) replaced current absolute performance
contracts is evaluated. Finally, sources of in-
come variability and their relative importance
in pork production are estimated.
Hog Production Contracts
Production contracts exist in several catego-
ries: sow farrowing arrangements, specialized
nursery units, feeder pig enterprises, finishing
operations, and farrow-to-finish farms. Grimes
and Rhodes estimate that nationally, finishing
contracts occur twice as often as either farrow-
ing or farrow-to-finish contracts. The popular-
ity of nursery contracts is more difficult to as-
sess since this type of agreement has emerged
1As pointed out by anonymous reviewers, a sub-
stantial amount of literatureexists on the transactions
costs explanation for vertical coordination or integra-
tion (e.g., Cease; Williamson; and others). Although
significant reductions in transactions costs may occur
from contracting, this studyfocuses on therisk-shifting
aspects of contract production that arise from produc-
tion and price shocks associated with pork production.
Likewise, although a potentially important factor, risk
associated with an integrator’s ability and willingness
to continuously fill the grower’s house to capacity with
healthy pigs is not addressed.
relatively recently with the introduction of
segregated early weaning practices. Finishing
contracts are the focus of this study.
Finishing contracts may be as simple as a
farmer contracting with a neighbor to finish a
current excess of feeder pigs. More often,
these contracts are multiperiod agreements be-
tween a large firm and a farmer which require
the farmer to meet specific production stan-
dards. To capture economies of scale in pro-
duction, many farmers own multiple houses.
The cost of a 1,000-head finishing house rang-
es from $80,000 to $150,000, depending upon
building design and geographic location. A
contract farmer in the Southeast may borrow
from $200,000 to $1 million to construct sev-
eral of these facilities (Warrick and Stith).
Such large-scale coordinated production has
enabled farmers in states outside the tradition-
al hog belt to quickly expand production,
Grower Income Variability Under
Absolute and Relative Performance
Production contracts may tie compensation to
performance in one of two ways. The first uses
an absolute measure of performance and the
second uses a relative measure of perfor-
mance. In the first, a farmer is evaluated
against an absolute standard and earns a spec-
ified piece-rate payment. In the second, a
farmer is evaluated against similar growers. A
relative performance (RP) contract may take
one of two forms: compensation may be based
on a grower’s performance rank (x cents per
pound for first place, y cents per pound for
second place, and so on), or linearly upon his
or her performance relative to the average of
other growers.
Relative performance contracts are the pri-
mary form used in the broiler industry, but
almost all hog integrators currently use only
absolute performance contracts.z Which con-
tract best reduces income variability depends
upon the type of shock to which a farmer is
subject. To see this, consider the following
2One major North Carolina integratorbegan offer-
ing a relative performance contract around 1993.Martin: Pork Production Contracts and Risk Shl~ting 269
typical absolute performance contract that de-
termines grower payment by
(1) Y~~= XG,, + b(~C – FC,,)HD,,,
where Y# = absolute performance contract
payment, X = fixed piece rate per pound
gained, Git = pounds gained, b = incentive
coefficient used in calculating per head bonus,
~C = standard feed conversion ratio, F’C1,=
actual feed conversion ratio, HD1, = head
shipped to market, i = grower (i = 1, . . . ,
k), and t = herd (i.e., “turn”; t = 1, . . . . n).
Under this contract, the grower receives a
fixed piece rate, X, per pound of gain with a
bonus paid per head.3 The size of the bonus is
based on the difference between the grower’s
feed conversion ratio (pounds of feedfpounds
of gain) and a standard feed conversion ratio.
The standard ratio lies below the support of
the feed conversion ratio probability distribu-
tion. With this contract, the variability of a
farmer’s income4 is
(2) Var(YAp) = X2U& + (bHD)2u;c,
– 2(XbHD)CovcG,,~c,).
Now consider a possible relative perfor-
mance contract. Farmers who finish hogs dur-
ing a set time interval are grouped together in
a single “round” and each receives a pay-
ment:
(3) Y:; = XGL,,+ b(FC, – FC,,,)HD,,,,
where Y~~ = relative performance payment,
~C, = head-weighted mean feed conversion
ratio for the round, {i = 1, . . . , k} indicates
growers, {t= 1, . . . , n} indicates herds, and
{r= l,..., m} indicates round.
qTypical valuesfor X andb are $0.03 per pound
and $6 per head, respectively.
4This variance decomposition is facilitated by
treatingHD as a constant. Given that contract farmers
operate with a standard finishing house, and contracts
usually specify thatthe house must be filled to at least
90% capacity, treating the number of finished hogs as
fixed is not altogether unrealistic. This assumption is
made only for theoretical simplicity and will not atter
any conclusions. Later empirical estimates of payment
variability capture all variance and covariance terms.
A grower i’s relative performance is mea-
sured as ~C, – FClt,. Here, FC, is the weight-
ed mean feed conversion ratio for the round
calculated as
~ ~ FC,,,HD,,,
(4) FC, = ‘=’ ;=’ ,,
~ ~ HD,,,
This relative performance contract is similar
to the absolute performance contract in (1),
but uses the average feed conversion ratio for
each round as a benchmark rather than a fixed
standard. Under this RP contract, grower i’s
payment variability is
(5) Var(YRp)




Comparison of the two variance terms shows
that the RP contract will reduce the variance
of grower payment relative to the absolute per-
formance contract if
(6) (bHD)2u~, + 2(XbHD)Cov(G,,=,)
– 2(bHD)2Cov(m,,~c,) <0.
As a simplification, if one assumes that the
Cov(~,,firl is zero, then relative to the absolute
performance contract in (1), RP contracts will
further reduce grower i’s income variability if
(7) u~, – 2cov(m,,FcJ)<0.
Whether or not (7) is true will depend upon
the size of the common production shock(s),
the growers’ idiosyncratic shocks, and the
number of growers in a round.
Two characteristics of relative performance
contracts cause this uncertainty. First, RP con-
tracts reduce variability by sorting out produc-
tion shocks common to contemporaneous270 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1997
growers. Such common shocks may arise if
the integrator varies the feed or animal genet-
ics provided to all growers in a round. Since
common production shocks affect both the in-
dividual’s effort level (measured by FC1) and
the average effort level (measured by F’C,), the
covariance term captures the size of the shock
and sorts out common production risk. Sec-
ond, RP contracts may increase an individual’s
payment variability by including a new source
of randomness, the opponents’ effort level.
This effect is captured by the inclusion of the
opponents’ shocks in the round mean feed
conversion ratio. Any shock specific to one
farmer (i.e., an idiosyncratic shock such as a
water pipe bursting) affects the round mean
feed conversion ratio.5 As discussed in Holm-
strom, and in Green and Stokey, if the number
of farmers in a round is sufficiently large, this
term tends toward zero. Therefore, if risk re-
duction is an important benefit, one should ex-
pect to find relative performance contracts
used when there are production shocks com-
mon to all farmers and either idiosyncratic
production shocks are small or the number of
contract farmers is large.
5Equation (7) can be further analyzed by treating
the variable HD as a constant. The weighted average
feed conversion ratio in (4) then becomes a simple av-





Here, common shocks are capturedin the a,, terms; the
cost of the RP contract is including the opponents’ id-
iosyncratic shocks, theu; terms,Now consider thecase
where all production shocks are common, so thata? =
& = ~z, and with pairwise correlation Coefficient P =
1! In this case, (7a) reduces to –uz, and theRP contract
dominates the absolute performance contract. Another
extreme case occurs when all shocks are idiosyncratic
and thereare no common production shocks, i.e., u,, =
O,and p = O.Here, the left-hand side of (7a) becomes
2--a: +(- —q2.
n2
If the opponents’ shocks are significant, then this term
will be positive and the RP contract causes grower i’s
income to be more variable than under the absolute
performance contract in (l).
Data and Empirical Methodology
To assess the risk-shifting effects of contract
production, data were collected on the perfor-
mance of farmers under contract with one
North Carolina integrator. These data describe
the performance of 123 finishing farmers who
operated under the absolute performance con-
tract described in equation (1) from September
1985 through December 1992. Included in the
data are the number of hogs placed and mar-
keted, pounds gained, feed consumed, and
grower payment for each farmer and herd.
Placement and removal dates for each herd
also are given. There are 805 total observa-
tions (i.e., 805 groups of pigs, where each
group is referred to as a herd).
Grower payment is measured per house per
day, but the data are reported either per house
or per farm. Farm size ranges from 1–5 hous-
es, with a mean of 1.6. The data are trans-
formed to a per house per day measure by first
dividing grower payment by the number of
days a herd occupies the house, plus seven
days for preparing the house between herds.G
If a grower’s payment is reported for multiple
houses, then the payment is divided by the
number of houses. Thus, each payment is
transformed to a per house per day basis. This
measure reflects the daily return to the grower
for labor and investment. The average number
of observations per farmer (i.e., herds per
grower over the study period) is 6.5, and rang-
es from two to 37.7
During the study period, the feed conver-
sion standard facing growers decreased from
3.50 to 3.35. With the lower ratio, the standard
for commingled pigs was kept at 3.50. Con-
CSeven days is used as an estimate of the days
needed for cleanup between herds. Due to the record
keeping procedures of this particular integrator,it was
not always possible to determine the days between
groups for a particulargrower. As one reviewer noted,
companies try to turn the house every six to seven
days, but this is not always practiced or possible, there-
by introducing an additional risk to the grower.
7Forty-six of these growers produced less thanfive
herds during the sample period. Because of the lower
numbers of observations for these growers, they are
not included in the variance analysis in the following
sections.Martin: Pork Production Contracts and Risk Shijting 271
sequently, a farmer who operated under the
contract described in (1) may have faced dif-
ferent performance standards: a benchmark of
3.50 in the early period (regardless of whether
or not the pigs were commingled); in the later
period, a standard ratio of 3.35 for non-com-
mingled pigs and a standard ratio of 3.50 for
commingled pigs. Because changes in perfor-
mance standards are a real risk to contract
growers, the two periods are not analyzed sep-
arately.s
Absolute Performance Contracts
To assess the effect of absolute performance
contracts on income variability against the
benchmark of independent farmers, it is first
necessary to simulate income for independent
producers. To do this, the performance data for
each actual contract grower are used to con-
struct a measure of “independent farmer” net
variable income. This income is calculated for
each farmer by presuming that the individual
faces market prices for inputs and output, but
that input use and output are identical to that
of the counterpart contract grower. Net vari-
able income here is a partial profit term de-
fined as total revenue from hog sales less ma-
jor variable input costs (feed and feeder pigs).
This measure captures the major costs and rev-
enues associated with hog production that
vary significantly over time.
Feed and animal prices are required to sim-
ulate income for independent producers. Mar-
ket prices for feed, feeder pigs, and finished
hogs are obtained from Agricultural Prices
(U.S. Department of Agriculture/National Ag-
ricultural Statistics Service). Quarterly feed
prices for the Appalachian region are report-
ed.9 Since hogs are fed over a period of four
to five months, it is necessary to convert the
quarterly data to monthly prices. A four-month
interpolation is used for this transformation.
The interpolated monthly feed prices are then
8The distinction between commingled and non-
commingled feeder pigs becomes more important
when relative performance payments are simulated in
the following sections.
yPrices for 1985 are reported monthly. All other
years are reported as noted.
matched to the last shipment date. For in-
stance, if the last shipment date is April 12,
the market feed price used to decide feed cost
is ~~,,,11, an average of the interpolated prices
of the previous four months. Feeder pig prices
also are reported quarterly, but are listed by
state. To estimate monthly prices, an interpo-
lation of the quarterly data is again performed.
The monthly prices are matched to each herd’s
average starting date. Finally, monthly prices
received by North Carolina farmers for bar-
rows and gilts are used as market prices for
hogs. These prices are matched to the average
ending date of each herd. The average ending
date is a weighted average of the dates that the
animals in a herd are moved to market. The
number of animals moved per day determines
the weight.
Independent grower simulations are con-
structed for a farmer who purchases feeder
pigs and feed on the market and sells finished
hogs. Using actual production data for a con-
tract farmer and these monthly price series, the
net variable income of a simulated indepen-
dent grower is calculated as follows: 10
(8) Y;;D = (P;Q;,) – (P;Q;,) – (pfQ;,),
where Y~)’D = income for independent finishing
farmer, P? = price per pound of hog, Q;, =
pounds of hog produced, P: = price per pound
of feed, Q[, = pounds of feed consumed, P;
= price per pound of feeder pig, Q;, = pounds
of pig purchased, i = farmer (i = 1, . . . ,
123), j = month, and t = herd (t= 1, . . .,
n).
For each farmer, risk shifting is examined
by testing the hypothesis of equal payment
variances, Ho: u&w = U&P. The alternative
hypothesis is a greater variance for the inde-
pendent farmer. Since the simulated payments
and actual contract payments are correlated, a
10Although other inputcosts, such as utilities and
capital payments, may be stochastic, it is assumed that
both contract farmers and independentfarmers face the
same costs. Therefore, these expenses are not included
to describe variability.272 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1997
conventional F-test is not appropriate. 11 In-
stead, the Pitman test, which is an exact test
for the equality of two variances for correlated
variables, is used. llvo variables are first con-
structed from the data: U, = Y~P + Y~~D, and
V, = Y~p – Y{ND.The COV(U,, VJ then equals
the difference in the two payment variances,
Cov( u,, v,) = u~ymo – U&W (Morrison). The
exact distribution of r, the sample correlation
coefficient, under normality and the null hy-
pothesis, is used to test the hypothesis that the
Cov( U,, V,) equals zero. The Pitman test is
conducted as an individual test for each farmer
and not a joint test for contract farmers as a
group.’ 2 As shown in table 1, each of the 77
growers rejects the null hypothesis of equal
payment variances at both the .05 and .10 sig-
nificance levels. Clearly, those farmers who
operated under this particular absolute perfor-
mance contract reduced the risk associated
with variable farm income.
Recognizing that the above test statistic
may be sensitive to small sample size and de-
viations from normality, a second criterion is
used to evaluate risk shifting. For each farmer,
a ratio is formed which consists of the stan-
dard deviation of the simulated independent
payment to the standard deviation of the actual
payment (Knoeber and Thurman). A ratio
greater than one implies the simulated pay-
ment is more variable than the contract pay-
ment. All farmers have ratios greater than one,
The mean ratio is equal to 10.55, and ranges
from 2.76–28.41. This implies that, on aver-
age, the income variability of the simulated
independent farmer is more than 10 times
1 ] In addition, thepricesused in the COMt’UCdOn of
the market payments may be biased. Each of the mar-
ket prices used in this analysis is an average regional
price and not an individual price facing the farmer.
Generally, the average price will be less variable than
the local market price. Note, however, that this study
is interestedin testing the hypothesis thatincome vari-
ability for a contract farmer is equal to that facing an
independent farmer with an alternative hypothesis of
greater income variability for the independent farmer.
Therefore, any test that rejects the null hypothesis us-
ing the less variable average feed price would certainly
lead to rejection of the null had the more variable in-
dividual price been available.
1 zA B~tlett test soundly rejects the hypothesis of
equal variances among farmers.
greater than his or her counterpart contract
grower. Alternatively, one can interpret the
standard deviation of independent farmer in-
come as a measure of pork production risk and
conclude that contract producers face only
9.59o of the risk borne by their independent
counterparts. This implies that approximately
90’% of pork production risk is shifted to the
integrator.
Relative Performance Contracts
A second objective of this study is to explore
the potential for additional risk shifting if rela-
tive performance contracts, similar to those
used in the broiler chicken industry, replaced
existing absolute performance contracts. To
evaluate this potential, it is necessary to sim-
ulate grower payments based on a relative
measure. Three potential RP contracts similar
to equation (3) are simulated. Each RP simu-
lation restricts the sum of all grower payments
to equal the actual total payments of the in-
tegrator, i.e., the simulated mean payment per
pound gained (per head) equals the actual
mean payment per pound (per head) paid by
the integrator. This restriction is imposed to
preserve the total payments paid by the inte-
grator, but to allow the variance of the RP pay-
ments to individual growers to differ from that
of the actual absolute performance contract
payment.
For purposes of the relative performance
simulations, farmers are grouped into rounds
based on the contract specifications under
which they operated. For example, all farmers
who closed out their finishing houses in June
of 1992 are grouped together. If a farmer fin-
ished commingled pigs in the same month, he
or she would be in a different round. In this
way, farmers are compared only to those
growers facing similar conditions. One hun-
dred thirty-two rounds are formed from this
grouping. The mean number of farmers per
round is equal to 6.09, but ranges from one to
44.
The first simulated RP contract parallels
the actual absolute performance contract, but
uses the round mean feed conversion ratio de-Martin: Pork Production Contracts and Risk Sh@ing 273
Table 1. Testing for Equal Payment Variances Between Actual Absolute Performance Grower
and Simulated Independent and Relative Performance Growers
Percentage of Growers Who Reject HO
Null Hypothesis c1= .05 a = ,10
----------------- (%) ------------------
Simulated Independent Grower:’
u? #ND = u;yAP 100.0 100.0
Simulated Relative Performance Grower:’
(1) u~yAF = @y,Pl 25.9 36.4
(2) u~y., = U;YRP2 63.6 70.0
(3) u~yAP = U;PRP3 44.2 51.9
Notes: U: #ND = paymentvariancefor simulatedindependentgrower i; u; p, = paymentvariancefor actualabsolute
performancecontractgrower i; u~,,,, = paymentvariancefor the first simulated relative performance contract, grower
i; u? ~RP2 = payment variance for the second simulated relative performance contract, grower i; and U? yRP7 = payment
variancefor thethirdsimulatedrelativeperformancecontract,grower i.
aAnalysis includes only those growers with at least five observations.
scribed in equation (4) instead of the absolute
standard:
(9) Y!:’ = XG,,, + b(FC, – FC,,,)HD,,, + kC,
where Yj~l = relative performance payment
one, ~C, = head-weighted mean feed conver-
sion ratio, h= = a constant equal to the mean
bonus payment actually made by the integrator
for each contract type, b = performance in-
centive coefficient = 6.0, i = grower (i = 1,
. . . . 123), l=herd(t =1, . . ..rz). and~ =
round (r = 1, . . . , 132),
Here, the piece-rate payment, X, and the
incentive coefficient, b, are kept at the same
levels as in the actual contract. The second
simulated RP contract also is similar to the
actual contract, but the incentive coefficient is
set equal to $1 per head, a substantial reduc-
tion from the original value of approximately
$6 per head. The second RP contract payment,
YRP2,is specified as
(10) Yfi~2= XG,,, + (FC, – FC,,,)HD,,, + AC.
In contrast to the actual contract, the final
relative performance scheme bases grower
compensation on only the number of hogs in
a herd and the grower’s relative performance.
Similar to broiler contracts, the difference be-
tween the grower’s feed conversion ratio and
the average feed conversion ratio for his or her
round is multiplied by the number of animals.
This third relative performance contract is
simulated as
(11) Yf:3 = [8, + (FC, – FC,,,)IHD,,,,
where Y&’q = relative performance payment
three, and tiCis a constant equal to the mean
per head payment made by the integrator for
each contract type.
From the integrator’s viewpoint, the sum of
all bonuses is zero; therefore, the mean pay-
ment per pound (per head) for each simulated
contract type is equal to the actual average
payment per pound (per head) paid by the in-
tegrator. To determine if RP contracts have the
potential for additional risk shifting, the hy-
pothesis of equal payment variances is tested.
This is a one-sided test with an alternative hy-
pothesis of a greater payment variance for the
absolute performance payment. Again, the Pit-
man test is used to test the hypothesis. Results
from this test are inconclusive. However, the
results do show that the value of the incentive
coefficient greatly affects the percentage of
farmers who further reduce income variability
under potential relative performance contracts.
Recall that the first two RP payments are
similar to the actual absolute performance
contract, but YRP2uses a smaller incentive co-
efficient. Evaluating the first RP payment sim-
ulation, only 36.4% of the farmers show sta-274 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1997
tistically significant income variance reduction
at the .10 significance level (table 1), How-
ever, under the second RP simulation at the
.10 significance level, the percentage of farm-
ers that reject the null hypothesis of equal in-
come variances increases to 70%. The third
RP contract simulation more closely corre-
sponds to modern broiler contract specifica-
tions. With this payment, 51.9?6 of the farmers
show statistically significant income variance
reduction at the .10 significance level.
As a second criterion to evaluate risk re-
duction, the ratio of the standard deviation of
the simulated relative performance payment to
the standard deviation of the actual contract
payment is constructed. A ratio less than one
implies less payment variability with the RP
contract than with the actual absolute perfor-
mance contract. The mean ratios of the stan-
dard deviation of the RP payments to the ac-
tual contract payment are all less than one.
However, several farmers produce ratios great-
er than one for each simulation. The ratio of
the standard deviation of the first RP payment
to the actual contract has a mean of 0.89, but
a range from 0.49– 1.61; when YRP2is ana-
lyzed, the ratio ranges from 0.35–1 .46 with a
mean of 0.69; and the third simulation leads
to a mean ratio of 0,74 and a range from 0.36–
1.76. Again, using the mean ratios as a mea-
sure of risk shifting, these values suggest that,
on average, absolute performance contracts
are slightly more risky than the three relative
performance contracts analyzed here (approx-
imately 1.12 to 1.45 times more risky). The
mean ratios also indicate that relative perfor-
mance contracts may shift as much as 93.5%
of pork production risk to the integrator (6.5%
borne by the grower under YR’2).
Given the varying rejection percentages
and the sensitivity of income variability to in-
centive levels, two issues merit further discus-
sion. First, the question addressed in this study
is direct: Would the growers who operated un-
der the absolute performance contract have re-
duced income variability with these possible
RP contracts given that their performance does
not change? This study suggests that the an-
swer may be yes, but it will depend upon the
contract specifications and types of shocks.
This study does not address the possibility of
contract design affecting performance. Clear-
ly, this is an important extension. Second, the
first two RP simulations suggest a tradeoff be-
tween performance incentive and income vari-
ability. More growers reject the null hypoth-
esis when the incentive coefficient equals 1.0
instead of 6,0. For a sample farmer, figure 1
displays the effect on payment variability of
changing the incentive coefficient. Again,
what cannot be analyzed is the effect of great-
er incentive on grower performance, but the
direction of the effect is clear. As b increases,
grower pay is tied more closely
mance. So raising b implies more
but also more risk.
Sources of Income Variability
to perfor-
incentive,
As demonstrated in equations (6) and (7), the
effectiveness of an RP contract as a risk-shift-
ing mechanism depends upon the sources of
shocks. To evaluate the relative contributions
of different shocks to income variability,
grower income variance is decomposed into
three components: idiosyncratic production
variability, common production variability,
and price variability (Knoeber and Thurman).
The idiosyncratic portion stems from a farm-
er’s actions and is specific to the individual
farmer; the common production shock arises
in situations where all contract farmers face
the same production shock; and price vari-
ability reflects shocks in input and output pric-
es.
Recall that the independent farmer faces all
three risks: idiosyncratic production, common
production, and price. The farmer who oper-
ates under the absolute performance contract
avoids price risk since the integrator provides
major variable inputs and sets output price. Fi-
nally, relative performance contracts poten-
tially sort out the common production risk that
remains under absolute performance contracts.
Using earlier notation and omitting the grower
subscript, let each of the payment series for
herd tMartin: Pork Production Contracts and Risk Shfting 275
1 Actual ContractPaymentVariance
b=O b=l Actual b b=10
Incentive Coefficient (b)
Figure 1. Relationship between incentive level and payment variance for a representative
contract grower
Here, e;, &, and 6; represent idiosyncratic,
common production, and price shocks, respec-
tively. The above equations can be written as




To recover the covariance matrix of the unob-
servable qs, the covariance matrix of the ob-
servable Y, is first estimated. Recognizing that
the covariance matrix of Y, can be described
by COVY= OCOV,(O’ , then the covariance ma-
trix of the unobservable ~,s is COVE =
~- lCOVY(O-1)’, which yields the following co-
variance matrix:
Interpreting total income variability as the in-
come variability resulting from the independent
payment, six potential sources of income vari-
ability are identified:
Var(Y{~D)= Var(ej + e: + ~f)
=U; +u$+cr$
+ 2(U,C + cr,p + Ucp).
The relative importance of each of these
sources is assessed by determining the pro-
portional contribution of each source. Specif-
ically, these shares are276 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1997
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Various Sources of Income Variation Under Al-
ternative Relative Performance Payment Schemes
AlternativeRelative Performance Schemes
Sources Mean RP1 Mean RP2 Mean RP3
Idiosyncratic (a,) 0.0139 0.0084 0.0097
(0.0184) (0.0132) (0.0135)
Common Production (I@ 0.0027 0.0060 0.0075
(0.0027) (0.007 1) (0.0121)
Price (e+) 0.9417 0.9417 0.9417
(o. 1494) (o. 1494) (o. 1494)
Idiosyncratic X Production (a,C) 0.0012 0.0034 0.0006
(0.0062) (0.0089) (0.0161)
Idiosyncratic X Price (a,P) 0.0510 0.0296 0.0298
(0.1209) (0.0984) (0.1077)
Production X Price (acF) –0.0104 0.0109 0.0107
(0.0434) (0.0633) (0.0717)
a,+ar+ap 0.96 0.96 0.96
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Notes. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. The terms a,, ac, and a, represent the proportional contribution
of Idiosyncratic, common production, and price risk, respectively, to total payment variability inherent in pork produc-
tion for the hog finisher; the covariance proportion terms a,,-, a,~, and acP show the joint contributions of two shocks.
Analysis includes only those growers with at least five observations.
u,/, m CP
a“ = Var(YjN~)’ acp = Var(Y~ND)”
Note that the sum of the six ratios must equal
one. Also, adopting the terminology of Knoe-
ber and Thurman (K-T), the “pure” contri-
bution of an individual shock (a,, ac, and cxP)
must be positive. There are no a priori restric-
tions placed on the covariance terms. Table 2
provides the relative contribution of idiosyn-
cratic, common production, and price risk, as
well as their corresponding covariance terms.
The final row in the table presents the sum of
the pure contributions. The columns in table 2
show the mean ratios across all growers, X,
and their standard deviations. Each of the
three different relative performance simula-
tions results in a different measure of idiosyn-
cratic risk.
Price shocks have the largest influence on
income variability-approximately 94% (table
2). This percentage is higher than the 84% de-
termined by K-T for the broiler chicken in-
dustry, In pork production, the pure contri-
butions of idiosyncratic and common
production shocks are small, between O–1%.
In contrast, each of these shocks accounts for
39Z0of total broiler production variability. The
sum of the pure contributions accounts for ap-
proximately 96% of total variability, slightly
higher than the 90% found in the broiler in-
dustry.
The largest interactive effect comes from
the relationship between idiosyncratic and
price risk, U,P.This interactive term accounts
for roughly 3–5% of total variability, similar
to the 5?t0determined by K-T. The joint influ-
ence of idiosyncratic and common production
risk accounts for the smallest proportion of
variability. Similar to broiler production, this
study attributes the interactive effect of idio-
syncratic and common production risk to be
less than 17. of total variability,
The magnitude and direction of the inter-
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risk strongly depend upon the RP payment de-
sign, Both the second and third RP designs
lead to a 1% contribution from the joint effect,
but the joint effect with the first RP contract
causes a slight decrease in variability (table 2).
Regardless of the payment design used, the
interactive effect is minimal, and contrasts
with results reported by K-T. In broiler chick-
en production, UCP determines 490 of total risk.
At first glance, this contrast with pork produc-
tion may seem puzzling. However, when one
considers the source of the interactive term,
the estimates are more plausible.
In broiler production, broiler price accounts
for the largest component of price risk. A pos-
itive covariance term between price and com-
mon production risk suggests that when broil-
er prices increase, integrators increase flock
size and contemporaneous growers receive
larger payments. With broilers, the lag period
between chick placement and harvest is a
short six to seven weeks. With finishing hogs,
however, that interval expands to nearly five
months. A smaller, but still positive, combined
effect of price and common production risk for
hogs suggests that integrators are less likely,
or less able, to alter herd size in order to cap-
ture higher output prices. This may be due ei-
ther to more restrictive housing requirements
(space per animal) or to the duration of the
gestation and weaning cycles for swine rela-
tive to poultry. Finally, a plausible explanation
for a negative interactive term is that integra-
tors do alter herd size in response to higher
hog prices, but the larger herd sizes lead to
more inefficient feed conversion ratios, and
contemporaneous growers receive lower pay-
ments rather than higher payments. In either
case, the small estimates for the combined ef-
fect in table 2 imply that the relationship be-
tween price and common production risk cur-
rently is much less important in pork
production than in broiler production.
Conclusions
The results presented here strongly support the
argument that relative to independent produc-
tion, contract farming reduces grower income
variability. Moreover, relative performance
contracts have the potential to further reduce
income variability. The relative performance
contracts examined in this study show a re-
duction in income variability for 36–70% of
the contract growers. Knoeber and Thurman
found much stronger evidence of risk reduc-
tion in the broiler chicken industry under rel-
ative performance contracts. Their research
concluded that 899Z0 of the broiler growers
showed statistically significant variance reduc-
tion with relative performance contracts as op-
posed to an absolute performance contract.
One reason for the difference is that in the
simulated relative performance contracts, the
number of growers per round tends to be
small. In this study, the mean number of farm-
ers in a round is equal to 6.09, thereby making
the relative contribution of each farmer to the
mean feed conversion ratio significant. With a
small pool of farmers in a given round, the
increased variability caused by the introduc-
tion of opponents’ idiosyncratic shocks out-
weighs the decrease from sorting out common
production risks. For example, if the feed con-
version ratio for one farmer is particularly
variable, it also will cause the mean feed con-
version ratio to be variable. Consequently,
farmers with stable absolute performance from
round to round will exhibit variable relative
performance. This would not be true if the
farmer is evaluated against many growers.
Therefore, a consequence of small pools in the
hog industry may bean increased income vari-
ability caused by the introduction of oppo-
nents’ idiosyncratic shocks, i.e., a significantly
large cr~r in (7).
A second plausible explanation of the weak
evidence for additional risk shifting is the na-
ture of the pork industry. Unlike broiler chick-
ens that are very homogeneous, pork produc-
tion is not yet characterized by such
uniformity. Whereas a broiler chicken is har-
vested at a uniform weight, a hog may go to
market at a weight between 220–280 pounds.
In addition, feeder pigs are placed on farms at
a weight between 30–60 pounds. This lack of
uniformity means that more variation in per-
formance in hog production will be idiosyn-
cratic, and less will be common. Since it is
only the common variation that can be sorted278 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1997
out by relative performance contracts, there is
less that these contracts can do to reduce
grower risk in hog production relative to broil-
er production. However, as integrators adopt
more uniform placement and market practices,
the advantage of relative performance con-
tracts grows. Nevertheless, results from this
study do show that regardless of the contract,
relative to independent pork production, pro-
duction contracts do reduce the risk associated
with variability in income. Furthermore, the
majority of this risk comes from input and out-
put price uncertainty and is shifted from the
farmer to the integrator. Still, the potential ex-
ists that relative performance contracts may
lead to additional risk shifting if more varia-
tion in grower performance is due to common
production shocks rather than to idiosyncratic
production shocks.
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